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CASENOTE; City of Missoula v. Mountain Water: Is Municipal 




I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 The saga of the City of Missoula’s (City) attempt to gain control 
of the privately held water system has concluded for now.1 In City of 
Missoula v. Mountain Water,2 the Montana Supreme Court found that the 
City’s ownership of the aging, privately held water system constituted a 
“more necessary public use.” The majority applied the correct standard of 
review and properly affirmed the lower court’s decision in accordance 
with precedent and relevant statutes. Mountain Water shed light on the 
“more necessary public use” analysis and the specificity of factual findings 
required to support the determination. 
  
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Mountain Water, a Montana corporation, has owned Missoula’s 
water system since purchasing it from Montana Power Company in 1979.3 
After failed negotiations to purchase Mountain Water, a giardia outbreak 
in the Rattlesnake, and mounting frustration with Mountain Water’s 
ownership of the water system, the City initiated its first condemnation 
proceeding against Mountain Water in 1984.4 A lengthy legal battle 
ensued, with two appeals to the Montana Supreme Court, but the City 
ultimately did not succeed in condemning Mountain Water.5 
The City, after its 2014 offer to purchase the water supply system 
for $50 million was rejected, filed a condemnation action in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in Missoula, seeking to exercise its power of 
eminent domain.6 The City initiated its condemnation action against 
Mountain Water and Carlyle Infrastructure Partners, LP (Carlyle), a global 
investment partnership and Mountain Water’s controlling shareholder.7 
The employees of Mountain Water (Employees) intervened in the suit.8  
The district court issued a 68-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Preliminary Order of Condemnation subsequent to a three-
                                           
1 City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., No. DA 15-0375, ___ P.3d ___, 2016 WL 4124135 (Mont. 
Aug. 2, 2016) (Rice, J. dissenting; McKinnon, J., dissenting); see generally City of Missoula v. 
Mountain Water Co., 742 P.2d 590 (Mont. 1987) (Sheehy, Holmstrom, JJ., dissenting) (Mountain 
Water I); City of Missoula v. Mountain Water Co., 771 P.2d 103 (Mont. 1989) (Mountain Water II). 
2 2016 WL 4124135, at *1.  
3 Mountain Water I, 742 P.2d at 592. 
4 Id. 
5 See Mountain Water I, 742 P.2d at 595; Mountain Water II, 771 P.2d at 110.  
6 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at *2. 
2016 CASENOTE: MISSOULA V. MOUNTAIN WATER 171 
week bench trial, finding that Missoula’s ownership of the water system 
constituted “a more necessary public use.”9 Defendants appealed the 
district court’s order and appropriately filed a claim for just compensation 
with the district court.10 The district court appointed commissioners, per 
statutory requirement, who determined the fair market value of Mountain 
Water at $88.6 million.11 Mountain Water did not appeal the 
commissioners’ assessed value of $88.6 million.12 Appellants Mountain 
Water, Carlyle, and Employees raised eight issues, including procedural, 
due process, and substantive claims; however, the main dispute centered 
on whether the City had proven, by a preponderance of evidence, whether 
its ownership of the water system constituted a “more necessary public 
use.”13  
 
III.   MAJORITY HOLDING 
  
Justice Cotter wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
McGrath and Justices Shea, Baker, and Wheat.14 The majority was 
unpersuaded by the Mountain Water’s procedural arguments, finding no 
reversible error with the district court’s rulings.15 Of the issues presented, 
the Court devoted the most time to analyzing the district court’s findings 
that led to its conclusion that the City’s acquisition of Mountain Water 
constituted “a more necessary public use.”16 The Court systematically 
addressed the district court’s findings and determined that the factual 
findings were “supported by substantial credible evidence and are not the 
product of bias in favor of public ownership.”17  
 
IV.   JUSTICE RICE’S DISSENT 
  
Justice Rice’s dissent forcibly argues that Mountain Water was 
deprived of due process due to an unconstitutional burden shift, various 
discovery abuses, rulings on inadmissibility of evidence, and the district 
court’s “judicial preference for condemnation.”18 Justice Rice agreed with 
Mountain Water that the district court’s findings aired an implicit bias that 
                                           
9 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order of Condemnation, City of Missoula v. 
Mountain Water Co., https://perma.cc/ZWP3-Y75K (Mont. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2015) (No. DV-14-352).  
10 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *7–8. 
11 Id. at *3; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206.  
12 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3.  
13 Id. at *1. 
14 Id. at *26. 
15 Id. at *4, 7, 9, 10 (holding that that the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motions for 
a continuance, refusing to dismiss Carlyle, excluding evidence of valuation, or precluding the claim 
based on collateral estoppel). 
16 See Id. at *19–27. 
17 Id. at *27. 
18 Id. at *28, 30, 32 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
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favored private ownership to municipal ownership.19 This presumption, 
Justice Rice stated, resulted in an unconstitutional burden shift and 
allowed the City to escape its burden of proving that its ownership of the 
water system was a “more necessary public use.”20  
 
V.   JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT 
  
Justice McKinnon authored a separate dissent that emphasized the 
majority’s error in applying the “more necessary” requirement. She also 
joined Justice Rice’s dissent regarding the discovery violations.21 
According to Justice McKinnon, the majority departed from precedent and 
erroneously applied the “more necessary public use” requirement.22 
According to Justice McKinnon, § 70–30–111(1)(c) and precedent require 
that the proposed public use be different from the current public use.23 
When the uses are identical, property cannot be taken for the same public 
use without express or implied legislative authorization.24 Justice 
McKinnon characterized the majority’s use of the “more necessary” 
requirement as both legally incorrect and overstepping the role of the 
judiciary by rule-making in an arena where policy makers are making 
important decisions about the necessity and desirability of public 
ownership.25  
 
VI.   ANALYSIS 
 
 The majority and Justice McKinnon’s application and 
interpretation of the “more necessary public use” requirement stand in 
sharp contrast. Justice McKinnon asserts that the analysis should not be 
applied when the proposed use is the same as the current use. The majority 
holds that the proposed use can be the same as the current use, 
emphasizing that municipal ownership destroys the for-profit use of the 
water system. Based on precedent and the correct interpretation of the 
statutes, the majority properly applied and analyzed the “more necessary 
public use” requirement. Further, although the discovery tactics used by 
the City were troubling, the majority properly found that the City’s actions 




                                           
19 Id. at *30–31; Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, City of Missoula v. Mountain Water, 
2015 WL 6407430 at *17–18 (Mont. Aug. 2, 2016). 
20 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *30–31; MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111. 
21 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *41–42 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
22 Id. at *35. 
23 Id. at *35, 39. 
24 Id. at *36.  
25 Id. at *40. 
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A.   Eminent Domain in Montana 
  
Eminent domain refers to a government’s inherent power to take 
private property for public use.26 The Montana legislature recognized 
certain public uses subject to the government’s power to exercise eminent 
domain, which includes “water and water supply systems.”27 
Condemnation proceedings are split into two procedural phases by statute: 
the necessity phase and the valuation phase.28 Condemnation proceedings 
commence with a necessity phase, and depending on the outcome of the 
necessity phase, conclude in a valuation phase.29 The first phase is based 
on a district court’s factual findings that determine whether the “public 
interest requires the taking.”30  
Before a property can be condemned, a condemnor must show by 
a “preponderance of the evidence that the public interest requires the 
taking based on the following findings . . . if already being used for a public 
use, that the public use for which the property is proposed to be used is a 
more necessary public use.”31 The “more necessary public use” 
requirement of § 70–30–111(1)(c) can be seen as an exception to the prior 
public use doctrine.32 According to the prior public use doctrine, if a 
property is already dedicated to a public use, then an entity cannot exercise 
its power of eminent domain over the property for a different public use 
unless the legislature has specifically authorized it.33 Both the language of 
§ 70–30–111(1)(c) and the prior public use doctrine presume a conflict or 
incompatibility of public uses.34 That is, the “more necessary public use” 
analysis will only be employed “when we have two public uses that are 
not compatible uses.”35  
Court precedent seemingly requires an initial inquiry before 
applying the “more necessary public use” analysis.  In Montana Talc Co. 
v. Cyprus Mines Corp.,36 the Court found that if the proposed public use 
                                           
26 26 AM.JUR.2D. Eminent Domain § 2 (WestlawNext through Sept. 2016); see also MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 70–30–101 (2015). 
27 McTaggart v. Mont. Power Co., 602 P.2d 992, 995 (Mont. 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–
102(6). 
28 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206; Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3. 
29 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70–30–206 to 207. 
30 Id. at § 70–30–111. 
31 Id. (emphasis added). 
32 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *36 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
33 26 AM.JUR.2D. Eminent Domain, supra note 26, § 103; see Cocanougher v. Zieigler, 112 P.2d 1058, 
1061 (Mont. 1941) (explaining that property already dedicated to a public use cannot be condemned 
for a different public use without clear or implied legislative intent).  
34 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111 (“if already being used for a public use, that the public use for 
which the property is proposed to be used is a more necessary public use”); 26 AM. JUR. 2D. Eminent 
Domain, supra note 26, § 103 (“Ordinarily, land devoted to one public use cannot be taken for another 
inconsistent public use unless . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
35 Mont. Power Co. v. Burlington N. Ry. Co., 900 P.2d 888, 894 (Mont. 1995) (citing Mont. Talc Co. 
v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 748 P.2d 444, 451–52 (Mont. 1987); Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1061; Butte, 
Anaconda & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mont. Union Ry. Co., 41 P. 232, 244 (Mont. 1895).  
36 748 P.2d at 452. 
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affects the owner’s rights “such that his use will be defeated or seriously 
interfered with . . . the statute requiring a ‘more necessary’ public use 
comes into play.” Similarly in Cocanougher v. Zeigler,37 the Court 
determined that the “more necessary public use” analysis is used when 
“the latter use is such as will destroy the prior use.” In Butte, Anaconda & 
Pacific Railway Co. v. Montana Railway Union Co.,38 the Court concluded 
“[w]e cannot agree that the statute which authorizes lands to be 
appropriated for a more necessary public use means a different public use 
in all cases. If the legislature had intended that construction . . . they could 
easily have said a different public use.”  
These Montana cases help produce a framework for determining 
whether uses are compatible, and thus whether to engage a “more 
necessary public use” analysis. The relevant analysis could be phrased: (1) 
are the proposed uses incompatible (using guidance from Montana Talc, 
Cocanougher, and Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co. to determine 
whether uses are compatible); and if so (2) is municipal ownership of a 
water system a more necessary public use than private ownership of a 
water system?  
 
B.   Application of the More Necessary Public Use Analysis 
 
The proposed public use of municipal ownership of the water 
system is incompatible with the former public use as a privately owned 
water system simply because the City’s ownership would destroy 
Mountain Water’s “right to the use of the [water system].”39 Or put another 
way, the City’s condemnation of the water system would result in 
Mountain Water’s being “completely deprived of [its] public use of 
appropriated property, such that [its] use will be defeated or seriously 
interfered with by the proposed condemnor’s right if granted.”40  
Although Justice McKinnon devotes much of her opinion to assert 
that the majority misapplied the “more necessary public use” analysis, the 
majority only briefly addresses Justice McKinnon’s argument and its 
application of the “more necessary public use” analysis: “the City’s 
acquisition of the water system would ‘inhibit’ Mountain Water’s use of 
its property by wholly depriving it of the use of the water system, the uses 
are not compatible, thus requiring the ‘more necessary’ analysis to be 
conducted.”41  
According to Justice McKinnon, the “more necessary use” 
requirement assumes that the use is incompatible with the current public 
use and that the use that forms the basis for the condemnation must be a 
                                           
37 Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060. 
38 41 P. at 246–247 (emphasis added). 
39 Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060. 
40 Montana Talc, 748 P.2d at 452. 
41 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *21. 
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different use.42 Without the requirement of a different use, the “more 
necessary” analysis “is necessarily reduced therefore to the virtues of 
private and public ownership.”43 Although Justice McKinnon is correct 
that the two uses must be incompatible for the Court to employ a “more 
necessary” analysis, she incorrectly interprets the statute and precedent to 
require that “incompatible” equal “different.”  
The majority properly interpreted and applied the “more necessary 
public use” analysis. The Court in Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co. 
explicitly rejected the requirement that the uses must be different.44 
Further, both Coconaugher and Montana Talc use language indicating that 
when one use will “destroy” or “completely deprive” the prior owner’s 
use, then they are incompatible and the “more necessary” test is 
employed.45 A municipality’s proposed public use can be incompatible 
with a private company’s ownership of the water system, despite being 
dedicated to the same use, simply because the municipality’s ownership 
of the water system is incompatible with Mountain Water’s ownership of 
the water system.  
 
C.   Factual Findings in Support of the More Necessary Public Use 
 
“‘Necessary,’ in the context of eminent domain, does not mean 
absolute or indispensable, but reasonable, requisite and proper for the 
accomplishment of the intended objective.”46 This standard is flexible and 
dependent on the circumstances of the exercise of the power of eminent 
domain.47 In determining whether a proposed public use is a “more 
necessary public use,” the Court looked at a broad range of factors, 
including:  
 
The owner’s profit motive, the consequences of out-of-
state ownership, the effect on public savings, rates, and 
charges, the effect of having the home office in the 
municipality, the public interest as expressed by city 
residents, the effect on the water system’s current 
employees, and ‘the importance of the City obtaining 
ownership of the water rights themselves, in order that the 
City may assure its inhabitants of long range access to 
water.’48 
                                           
42 Id. at *35. 
43 Id. at *38.  
44 Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry. Co., 41 P. at 246–47. 
45 Cocanougher, 112 P.2d at 1060; Montana Talc, 748 P.2d at 452. 
46 Park County v. Adams, 100 P.3d 640, 643 (Mont. 2004) (defining “necessary” under 70–30–111(b) 
“the taking is necessary to the use.” The Court in Mountain Water transfers the definition of 
“necessary” under subsection (b) and applies it to subsection (c) “a more necessary public use.”).  
47 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *21. 
48 Id. (quoting Mountain Water I, 743 P.2d at 595–96).  
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Justices Rice and McKinnon agreed with Mountain Water that the 
district court’s findings were based on a general preference for municipal 
ownership and not the specific factual findings that § 70–30–111(1)(c) 
requires.49 Defendants asserted that the factual findings were insufficient 
for the district court to find that the City’s acquisition was a more 
necessary public use. According to Mountain Water, the district court’s 
refusal to allow additional evidence of Mountain Water’s valuation in 
during the condemnation phase prevented the district court from truly 
assessing the financial circumstances and the impact on the savings, rates, 
and charges.50 The district court, in interpreting the statutory requirements 
of condemnation proceedings, held that allowing evidence of valuation in 
during the necessity phase would infringe on decisions left to the jury and 
the commissioners.51 The Court noted counsel’s assertion during oral 
argument that Mountain Water was no longer seeking a remand for a new 
trial, but rather, was seeking outright dismissal of the case.52 
The Court evaluated the district court’s exclusion of valuation 
evidence to determine if it was severe enough to require dismissal of the 
case and found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to admit evidence of the valuation.53 It is hard to predict whether or not 
counsel’s assertion was the death knell of this issue on appeal, but it seems 
that the Court would have remained unpersuaded given that some evidence 
of valuation was admitted, including evidence of rate increases in the event 
of a higher-than-expected acquisition price.54 Additionally, the ruling on 
the admissibility of further evidence of valuation is within the district 
court’s discretionary power to admit evidence.55 
Due to the fact-intensive nature of the lower court proceeding, a 
clearly erroneous standard was applied to much of the district court’s 
Preliminary Order of Condemnation.56 A clearly erroneous standard is the 
appropriate standard to apply to factual findings in support of a “more 
necessary public use” conclusion. Section 70–30–111 itself is titled “Facts 
Necessary to be Found Before Condemnation.”57 Precedent establishes 
that determining whether a proposed public use is a “more necessary 
                                           
49 Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, supra note 19, at *17–18; Mountain Water, 2016 
WL 4124135, at *28, 40 (Rice, J., dissenting; McKinnon, J., dissenting). 
50 Appellant Mountain Water Co.’s Opening Brief, supra note 19, at *21–23. 
51 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *7.  
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at *8.  
55 See Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 582 (Mont. 2007) (“When reviewing a district court’s 
evidentiary rulings we do not determine whether this Court would have made the same ruling. Rather, 
we determine whether the district court abused its discretion.”) (internal citations omitted).  
56 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *3 (“We review a district court’s findings of fact to 
determine if they are clearly erroneous.”). 
57 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–111. 
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public use” is a “fact-specific, judicial determination.”58 Under this 
standard, a district court’s factual findings will not be disturbed unless “the 
trial court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or a review of 
the record ‘leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.’”59 However, when a lower court applies 
factual findings to the appropriate legal framework, the Court employs a 
de novo review.60  
The Court exhaustively discussed the lower court’s 63 pages of 
factual findings.61 The Court found evidence to support the district court’s 
findings that the public supported the condemnation and that municipal 
ownership would promote long-term stability, efficiency, and 
infrastructure improvements.62 Additionally, the Court reviewed the City’s 
evidence about its ability to manage the water system and the financial 
considerations “including administrative expenses, profit motive, rate 
setting, and the cost of acquisition and needed capital improvements.”63 
The evidence at trial regarding the financial considerations came from 
experts, city employees, and testimony about the ability of the City to 
access state and federal grants that would not be available to a private 
owner.64 The district court also weighed public and economic policy 
factors, which included testimony from experts on the generalities of 
municipal ownership of water utilities.65 The district court also reviewed 
evidence regarding the effect on the public health, safety and welfare.66 
Finally, the district court assessed the impact of condemnation on 
Mountain Waters employees.67  
While it is true that the district court used broad-brush language 
in some of its factual findings, there was not a lack of specificity sufficient 
to overturn its factual findings, particularly when noting the broad 
deference inherent in a clearly erroneous standard. Based on the extensive 
factual findings made by the district court, the majority was bound to 
uphold them in light of the highly deferential standard imposed in 
reviewing findings of fact. Since the Court did not find error with the 
district court’s detailed factual findings, the Court similarly found no error 
in the court’s conclusion that the City’s acquisition of the water system 
                                           
58 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *9 (citing Mountain Water I, 743 P.2d at 594; Helena v. 
Rogan, 68 P. 798, 802 (Mont. 1902); Butte, Anaconda & Pac. Ry., 41 P. at 243).  
59 Id. at *10 (quoting Mont. Power Co., 900 P.2d at 890). 
60 BNSF Ry. Co. v. Cringle, 281 P.3d 203, 206 (Mont. 2012) (reviewing de novo “the district court’s 
application of controlling legal principles to its factual findings”).  
61 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *22. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 23.  
64 Id. at 24. 
65 Id. at 25. 
66 Id. at 26. 
67 Id. 
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constituted a more necessary use than its current use as a private, for-profit 
utility.68 
 
D.   Constitutional Due Process Concerns 
 
At its core, eminent domain is concerned with balancing 
fundamental interests: the public’s interest and private property owners’ 
procedural due process rights. Threaded through the eminent domain 
statutes are phrases that point to this tension: “just compensation”; “public 
use”; “more necessary”; and the various constitutional, notice, and 
procedural requirements of the laws governing eminent domain.  
The Montana Constitution designates the right to possess and 
protect property as an inalienable right.69 Because of Montana’s 
constitutional protection for property ownership, the power of eminent 
domain “must be strictly construed.”70 Additionally, the eminent domain 
statutes “must be given its plain interpretation, favoring the person’s 
fundamental rights.”71 Due to the nature of eminent domain proceedings, 
§ 70–30–206 instructs a district court to “give the proceedings expeditious 
and priority consideration.”72 The same statute likewise instructs the 
parties to proceed “as expeditiously as possible . . . through all aspects . . 
. including discovery and trial.”73 Ensuring that Mountain Water’s due 
process rights were not violated necessitates that Mountain Water “receive 
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before Missoula 
deprive[s] it of its property.”74 Further, due process encompasses “the 
ability to discover information relevant to the case against the defendants 
along with the identity of the witnesses who are expected to testify and the 
substance of the expected testimony.”75 
Mountain Water’s due process claim focused on the City’s 
discovery tactics that resulted in Mountain Water’s perceived 
unpreparedness for trial and unfair prejudice. According to Justice Rice, 
the City engaged in deliberately harmful discovery tactics that deprived 
Mountain Water of its due process.76 The majority disagreed, maintaining 
that Mountain Water conducted discovery effectively and were aware of 
who was to testify and the expected substance of testimony.77 The majority 
noted that Mountain Water “ha[d] demonstrated inconvenience and 
                                           
68Id. at *27.  
69 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
70 City of Bozeman v. Vaniman, 869 P.2d 790, 792 (Mont. 1994) (citing State v. Aitchison, 30 P.2d 
805 (Mont. 1934)).  
71 Id.  
72 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–206. 
73 Id. 
74 Mountain Water, 2016 WL 4124135, at *29 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
75 Id. at *5 (majority).  
76 Id. at *32 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. at *5 (majority) (the Court denied Mountain Water’s writ of supervisory control, indicating that 
if prejudice resulted the issue could be raised on appeal). 
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frustration” but concluded Mountain Water had not proved that the district 
court abused its discretion or that Mountain Water suffered actual 
prejudice.78 The majority also noted that Mountain Water had prepared an 
effective and full defense.79 
The majority may have been overly dismissive in concluding that 
Mountain Water’s due process rights were not violated, and it could be 
argued that the holding was influenced by the fact that the case involved 
prolonged and complex litigation between sophisticated parties. The 
majority noted Mountain Water’s presentation of a full and competent 
defense. However, Mountain Water’s argument and Justice Rice’s dissent 
detail the City’s discovery tactics and persuasively assert that the City 
deliberately abused the discovery process. Even so, given the district 
court’s discretion to control the discovery process and the nature of the 
litigation, Mountain Water did not provide enough evidence to support a 
conclusion that the trial was unfair or that Mountain Water did not receive 
sufficient notice and hearing. Due process is a tantamount concern in 
eminent domain proceedings, but the district court is given wide latitude 
in controlling the discovery process, and the parties are under specific 
instructions to proceed expeditiously in light of the unique circumstances 
that surround a condemnation proceeding (uncertainty to employees, 
ownership, importance to public etc.). 
 
E.   The Future of Eminent Domain in Montana 
 
Both dissenters point out the need for legislative action on this 
issue. Justice Rice’s directive is express, evidenced in a section of his 
dissent titled “A Word for the Legislature” In this section, Justice Rice 
encourages the legislature to revisit the statute to clarify the “more 
necessary public use” requirement.80 Justice McKinnon also would defer 
to the legislature. She identifies municipal ownership of utilities as an 
important public policy concern, best suited to resolution via the 
legislative process, not judicial intervention.81 However, Missoula’s water 
system was the only water system in Montana not owned by a 
municipality; therefore, we may not have the chance to see a municipality 
exercise its power of eminent domain over a water supply system again.82  
 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 
When a municipality attempts to exercise its power of eminent 
domain to condemn a water system already dedicated to public use, a court 
                                           
78 Id. at *6.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at *34–35 (Rice, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at *40–41 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).  
82 Id. at *1 (majority opinion).  
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should employ the “more necessary public use” analysis even when the 
proposed public use and the prior public use are the same. The majority 
properly applied the “more necessary public use” analysis and, given the 
broad deference inherent in review of factual findings, properly affirmed 
the district court’s Preliminary Order of Condemnation. Although 
Mountain Water helped to establish some framework for assessing 
competing public uses, the Court relied on the inherent flexibility in the 
deferential standard of review and circumstantial and factual nature of the 
determination of a “more necessary public use.” Trial courts should 
engage in very clear fact-finding. But because of the deference enjoyed by 
trial courts in fact finding, it seems likely that district court decisions will 
remain undisturbed without legislative intervention and guidance on the 
application of the “more necessary public use” analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
